Policy equilibrium and generalized metarationalities for multiple decision-maker conflicts by 曽  道智
Policy equilibrium and generalized
metarationalities for multiple decision-maker
conflicts
著者 曽  道智
journal or
publication title
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man and
Cybern tics, Part A: Systems and Humans
volume 37
number 4
page range 456-463
year 2007
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10097/46853
doi: 10.1109/TSMCA.2007.897704
456 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS—PART A: SYSTEMS AND HUMANS, VOL. 37, NO. 4, JULY 2007
Policy Equilibrium and Generalized Metarationalities
for Multiple Decision-Maker Conflicts
Dao-Zhi Zeng, Liping Fang, Senior Member, IEEE, Keith W. Hipel, Fellow, IEEE, and D. Marc Kilgour
Abstract—A policy equilibrium is defined, and its properties
investigated, for conflicts with more than two decision makers
(DMs). A fundamental construction is the metarational tree, which
expresses DMs’ interactions as sequences of rounds, each consist-
ing of an initial move by the focal DM followed by countermoves by
the opponents. Using the metarational tree, the stability definitions
of the graph model for conflict resolution can be adapted to apply
to policies. These generalized metarational stabilities are shown
to generalize Nash, general metarational, and symmetric metara-
tional stabilities. Relationships among generalized metarational-
ities are derived, as are their connections with policy equilibria.
Finally, the refinement that allows only credible moves (moves that
are in the immediate interest of the mover) produces a new family
of credible generalized metarational stabilities that generalizes the
concept of sequential stability in the graph model.
Index Terms—Conflict, graph model for conflict resolution,
metarational tree, multiple decision makers (DMs), policy analy-
sis, policy equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN STRATEGIC conflicts, decision makers (DMs) oftenthink in terms of how they will behave in situations that may
arise in the future. Consider, for example, North Korea’s contin-
ued development of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities,
which threatens neighboring states, as well as the U.S. North
Korea seems to have adopted the policy of maintaining its arms
development programs as long as other countries do not help
it meet its energy needs, and responding in force if attacked.
Likewise, the other actors in this conflict may have formulated
policies setting out how they would respond to any eventuality.
In this paper, such policies are studied formally for general
cases involving two or more DMs, extending the concept of
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policy equilibrium developed earlier for cases with exactly two
DMs [23], [24]. The context of this new approach to policy
analysis is the graph model for conflict resolution [2], [3], [12],
which uses a set of directed graphs to describe the decision
options of conflict participants.
A policy is analogous to a strategy in game theory in that
it specifies an action for each state in a conflict. With few ex-
ceptions, game theory approaches require that the DMs, called
players, act either in a specific sequence (extensive-form game)
or simultaneously (normal-form game). (Hamilton and Slutsky
[8] suggest an approach that avoids this strong requirement in
one restricted context.) In the real world, however, DMs may
sometimes choose to act in any sequence, or simultaneously,
or not at all. Conflicts in which timing and sequence are
indefinite—many negotiations, for example—are not so easily
modeled by games [1]. Moreover, game models require that
players’ preferences over outcomes be represented cardinally
by von Neumann–Morgenstern utilities [22]. This requirement
makes game models difficult to calibrate, as utilities are difficult
to measure. Furthermore, there are instances when a DM’s
preferences (determined by voting, for example) are not tran-
sitive. In the preface of [19], Raiffa states that “I found the
assumptions made in standard game theory too restrictive for
it to have wide applicability.”
The graph model for conflict resolution is designed to com-
plement classical game theory in a way that avoids these and
other problems. In a graph model, the conflict begins at a status
quo state and progresses from state to state via state transitions
controlled by various DMs, who may act whenever they choose
to. Formally, a graph model represents the state transitions
controlled by each DM as a directed graph with the set of
states as the vertex set. The graph model incorporates many
submodels of how a DM decides whether to move the conflict
from its current state and, if so, to which state to move. These
submodels, called stability definitions, allow for variation in
many aspects of decision styles, such as level of foresight
and level of risk aversion. Among these submodels, metara-
tional stability (general and symmetric), sequential stability
and limited-move stability have computational advantages, and
are widely used to analyze real-world conflicts [4], [5], [9],
[13], [18]. Recent extensions to the graph model methodology
include robustness analysis [20] and techniques for handling
preference uncertainty [15].
The goal of this paper is to design a procedure to identify
states that are stable as a direct consequence of DMs’ policies,
within the framework of a multi-DM graph model. Specifically,
the family of generalized metarational stabilities is defined
using the metarational tree, a device that describes possible
1083-4427/$25.00 © 2007 IEEE
Authorized licensed use limited to: TOHOKU UNIVERSITY. Downloaded on March 10,2010 at 01:58:51 EST from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
ZENG et al.: POLICY EQUILIBRIUM AND GENERALIZED METARATIONALITIES 457
strategic interactions over a series of rounds. The properties of
generalized metarationalities are compared in a fashion which
is analogous to the study by Fang et al. [2] of graph model
stability definitions. A DM’s policy is called credible if it
requires that moves be made to more preferred states only.
Assuming credible policies, the authors define the credible
policy equilibrium, credible metarational tree, and credible gen-
eralized metarational stabilities. Relationships between credible
policy equilibria and credible generalized metarationalities are
then derived. Finally, an existence theorem for policies with
various forms of credible generalized metarationality demon-
strates their relationship with the graph-model concept of se-
quential stability.
The remaining part of this paper is constructed as fol-
lows. Subsequent to the definition of a policy equilibrium
(Section II-B), the metarational tree and generalized metara-
tional stabilities are defined in Sections III-B and C, respec-
tively. Relationships among stability definitions, generalized
metarationalities, and policy equilibria are derived in Sec-
tion IV and summarized in Fig. 3. The study of stability and
equilibria under the restriction of credible moves is carried out
in Section V.
II. POLICY
The context for the policy definitions presented in
Section II-B is the graph model for conflict resolution, which
is outlined in Section II-A.
A. Graph Model for Conﬂict Resolution
A graph model for a strategic conflict consists of 1) a set of
DMs, 2) a set of states, 3) for each DM, a directed graph with
the set of states as vertices, and 4) for each DM, a preference
structure on the set of states. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} represent
the set of DMs and S = {s1, s2, . . . , su} the set of states. The
finite directed graph Di = (S,Ai), i ∈ N , keeps track of the
movements among states that DM i can make in one step.
The vertices (nodes) of the graph represent the possible states
(scenarios) of the conflict. If DM i can unilaterally move (in one
step) from state s1 to state s2, there is an arc with orientation
from s1 to s2 in Ai and DM i can reach state s2 from state s1.
For i ∈ N , DM i’s reachable list for state s ∈ S is the set Ri(s)
of all states which DM i can reach from state s.
The preferences of DM i over the set of states is described
by a pair of binary relations {i,∼i} on S, where s1 i s2, for
s1, s2 ∈ S, indicates that DM i prefers s1 to s2, and s1 ∼i s2
means that DM i is indifferent between s1 and s2. It is assumed
that i is asymmetric, that ∼i is reflexive and symmetric, and
that {i,∼i} is strongly complete.
Sometimes, the notation s1 i s2 is employed to indicate
that either s1 i s2 or s1 ∼i s2. Note that transitivity of pref-
erences is not assumed, so that the key results in this paper are
valid for both intransitive and transitive preferences.
A unilateral improvement from a specific state for a partic-
ular DM is any preferred state to which the DM can unilat-
erally move. The unilateral improvement list for DM i from
state s is denoted as R+i (s) = {s1 ∈ Ri(s)|s1 i s}. Simi-
larly, define R−i (s)={s1 ∈ Ri(s)|s i s1} and R=i (s)={s1 ∈
Ri(s)|s1 ∼i s}. Obviously, Ri(s)=R+i (s) ∪R−i (s) ∪R=i (s).
B. Policy Sequences and Policy Equilibrium
A DM in a conflict may announce in advance what he or
she intends to do at each state that could arise. For example, in
a labor-management negotiation, the labor union may declare
that it will go on strike if all of its demands are not met by the
company. The company, in turn, may have a policy to lock out
the union if it does not reduce its demands. Such a declaration,
or policy, is clearly intended to influence the final result of
the dispute.
Formally, a policy of DM i is a function Pi : S → S, such
that Pi(s) ∈ Ri(s) ∪ {s} and, therefore, Pi = {Pi(s), s =
s1, s2, . . . , su} [23], [24]. Thus, a policy for a DM specifies
what his or her action will be at each state (stay at that state or
move to another state) if that state arises.
Now, we consider the possible interaction of the DMs in a
sequence of moves and countermoves, in which no DM moves
twice consecutively. For example, given an initial state s0, a
DM i may move from s0 according to his or her policy Pi.
Then, another DM j ∈ N − i may move fromPi(s0) to another
state Pj(Pi(s0)). Depending on j’s move, yet another DM
p ∈ N − j, possibly i again, may move from Pj(Pi(s0)) to
Pp(Pj(Pi(s0))), and so on.
A sequence of moves can be defined as a sequence [s0, i1,
s1, i2, . . .] where sk ∈ S for k = 0, 1, . . . and ik ∈ N for i =
1, 2, . . . , where ik is called the moving DM of sk−1 for k =
1, 2, . . .. In addition, a sequence is required to satisfy ik+1 =
ik and sk+1 ∈ Pik+1(sk). However, a DM might move several
times if he or she does not move in succession. Therefore, in a
3-DM conflict, there might be a sequence in which DM 1 and
DM 2 move several times before DM 3 makes any move.
A sequence may be finite or infinite. A finite sequence of
length h is described as [s0, i1, s1, i2, . . . , ih, sh]. A sequence
terminates at s if the moving DM of s chooses to stay. The
result of a sequence of length h or a terminated sequence is the
last state. For an infinite sequence, there is at least one state that
repeats infinitely, because the number of all states in a conflict
model is finite. The result of an infinite sequence is defined to be
the first infinitely repeating state. This definition can be justified
by considering a move to have an infinitesimal cost as re-
flected in the inertia assumption defined by Kilgour and Zagare
[14, p. 94] and the rational termination assumption of Brams
[1, p. 27]. Notice that only ordinal preference information is
used in the graph model and cardinal utilities are not assumed.
Therefore, the average payoff of some or all infinitely repeating
states cannot be calculated.
Given a state s0 and a series of DMs i1, i2, . . . , and the
policies of DMs, a sequence of moves is obtained: [s0, i1,
s1, i2, . . .], where sk = Pik(sk−1). Note that given the DMs’
policies, there may be more than one sequence, where each
corresponds to a series of DMs.
The concepts of a policy equilibrium and policy stable state
(PSS) for the case of two DMs are provided by Zeng et al. [23],
[24]. These ideas can be generalized for the case of two or more
DMs as follows.
Authorized licensed use limited to: TOHOKU UNIVERSITY. Downloaded on March 10,2010 at 01:58:51 EST from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
458 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS—PART A: SYSTEMS AND HUMANS, VOL. 37, NO. 4, JULY 2007
Fig. 1. Integrated graph for the truel game.
Deﬁnition 1: Policies P1, . . . ,Pn form a policy equilibrium
with respect to the status quo state s∗ if we have the following.
1) Pi(s∗) = s∗ holds for all i = 1, . . . , n.
2) For all i and P′i such that P′i(s∗) = s∗, there is at
least one sequence of moves with respect to policies
P1, . . . ,Pi−1,P′i,Pi+1, . . . ,Pn and status quo state s∗
such that the result of this sequence is not preferred to
s∗ by DM i.
A state s∗ satisfying the above two conditions is called a PSS.
The set of all PSSs is denoted by SPSS.
Example 1: Consider the truel game [11] in which each of
three DMs can either fire or not at either of the other DMs. The
objectives of each DM are the following: 1) the DM, himself or
herself, prefers to survive over being eliminated and 2) the DM
would like to see fewer of his or her opponents remain alive.
The first objective has a higher priority (i.e., is lexicographically
more important than the second objective). It is assumed that
each DM is a perfect shot, each shot eliminates one opponent,
and no cooperation is allowed.
Since the three DMs can shoot or move in any order, it
is not straightforward to describe this conflict using classical
game theory. Furthermore, it is difficult to estimate cardinal
preferences over the possible states. In contrast, the graph
model and the developments in this paper can be easily applied
to the truel. For convenience, three individual directed graphs
Di (i = 1, 2, 3) are combined into an integrated graph as shown
in Fig. 1, where a state is represented by the set of all surviving
DMs and the number i beside an arc indicates that the arc is a
member of Ai in graph Di.
The DMs’ preferences are as follows:
{1} 1 {1, 2} ∼1 {1, 3} 1 {1, 2, 3}
1 {2} ∼1 {3} 1 {2, 3}
{2} 2 {1, 2} ∼2 {2, 3} 2 {1, 2, 3}
2 {1} ∼2 {3} 2 {1, 3}
{3} 3 {1, 3} ∼3 {2, 3} 3 {1, 2, 3}
3 {1} ∼3 {2} 3 {1, 2}.
Let {1, 2, 3} be the status quo state. Consider the following
policy Pi of DM i = 1, 2, 3:
Pi(s) =
{
s− {j}, if s = {i, j}, where j = i
s, otherwise.
In words, DM i fires at DM j if i and j are the only remaining
DMs, and does not shoot at other states. These policies form a
policy equilibrium and the status quo state {1, 2, 3} is a PSS. In
fact, if a DM (say DM 1) changes his or her policy and fires at
another DM (say DM 2) at the states quo state, then DM 3 will
shoot at DM 1 according to P3, which terminates the sequence
of moves because no one can move again. The result of this
sequence is state {3}, which is less preferred than the status
quo by DM 1.
III. GENERALIZED METARATIONALITIES
In Section III-A, various types of unilateral moves and
stability definitions are presented following a more detailed
explanation given in [3]. The definition of the meterational
tree in Section III-B forms the framework for defining gen-
eral kinds of metarational stable states and resolutions in
Section III-C.
A. Nash Stability and General and
Symmetric Metarationalities
Let H be a subset of DMs and denote RH(s) [respectively
R+H(s)] as the set of results of all possible sequences of moves
(respectively unilateral improvements), by some or all of the
DMs in H , starting from state s. Each member of RH(s)
[respectively R+H(s)] is called a unilateral move (respectively
unilateral improvement) by H . When H consists of only one
DM i, then RH(s) [respectively R+H(s)] is also denoted by
Ri(s) [respectively R+i (s)], which is consistent with our no-
tations in Section II-A.
The first stability definition is based on the idea of
Nash [16], [17].
Deﬁnition 2: Let i ∈ N . A state s∗ ∈ S is Nash stable for
DM i, denoted by s∗ ∈ SNashi , iff R+i (s∗) = ∅. A state s∗ is
called a Nash resolution, denoted by s∗ ∈ SNash, iff it is Nash
stable for all DMs.
The second and the third stability definitions are based on
Howard’s work [10].
Deﬁnition 3: For i ∈ N , a state s∗ ∈ S is general meta-
rational (GMR) for DM i, denoted by s∗ ∈ SGMRi , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+i (s∗) there is at least one state sx ∈ RN−i(s1) with
sx i s∗. A state s∗ is called a general metarational resolu-
tion, denoted by s∗ ∈ SGMR, iff it is general metarational for
all DMs.
Deﬁnition 4: Let i ∈ N . A state s∗ ∈ S is symmetric meta-
rational (SMR) for DM i, denoted by s∗ ∈ SSMRi , iff for every
s1 ∈ R+i (s∗), there exists sx ∈ RN−i(s1), such that sx i s∗
and s2 i s∗ for all s2 ∈ Ri(sx). A state s∗ is called a sym-
metric meterational resolution, denoted by s∗ ∈ SSMR, iff it is
SMR for all DMs.
B. Metarational Tree
Given policies Pj of all DM j = i, we consider the decision
problem of DM i at state s = s1 in an n-person conflict. If
i seizes the initiative and moves, for example to state s11 ∈
Ri(s1), then another DM j1 ∈ N − {i} moves from s11 to
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Fig. 2. DM i’s metarational tree, given DM j’s policy Pj for all j ∈ N − i.
s12 = Pj1(s11) ∈ Rj1(s11). Depending on j1’s move, yet another
DM k1 ∈ N − {i, j1} might move from s12 to s13 = Pk1(s12) ∈
Rk1(s12), and so on. Note that, at state s1k (k = 2, 3, . . .), DM i
also has the opportunity to make another decision by staying
at s1k or moving to a state in his or her reachable list given
by Ri(s1k). If i moves from state s1k (redenoted by s2), for
example to s21, then other DMs may move from s21 according
to their policies, and so on. The above discussion is depicted
in Fig. 2.
Given DM i, a sequence is said to be of r rounds with respect
to DM i if there are r states in the sequence at which DM
i moves. Notice that, whenever DM i moves, a new round is
entered. Within each round, other DMs can move more than
once as long as two moves by a DM are not in succession.
Consider a sequence of r rounds with respect to DM i. We are
interested in two kinds of sequences within r rounds. The first
one, called i-sequence, ends with DM i as the last mover, and
another, called i¯-sequence, ends when other DMs do not move
further (more precisely, i¯-sequence ends just before entering the
r + 1 round). In the truel conflict in Example 1, only one round
is allowed, since no DM can move twice consecutively. In an
i-sequence, DM i shoots somebody and ends the sequence of
moves. In contrast, in an i¯-sequence, the other remaining DM
is allowed to shoot DM i after DM i shoots a DM.
The two kinds of sequences inspire two kinds of stabili-
ties. If all the resulting states of all i-sequences (respectively
i¯-sequences) in the metarational tree of r rounds are less than
or equally preferred by DM i to the original state s, then DM i
does not have the incentive to move away from s.
C. Metarationally Stable States of Round r
Deﬁnition 5: State s∗ is called i-metarationally stable (re-
spectively i¯-metarationally stable) with r rounds for DM i,
denoted by s∗ ∈ SMRri (respectively s∗ ∈ SMRri ), if for each
s ∈ Ri(s∗), there is a set of policies Pj of all j ∈ N − i, and
an i-sequence (respectively i¯-sequence) starting with [s∗, i, s]
of r rounds or shorter such that the result of this sequence
is not more preferred to s∗ by DM i. A state s∗ is called
MRr (respectively MRr) resolution, denoted by s∗ ∈ SMRr
(respectively s∗ ∈ SMRr ), iff it is MRr (respectively MRr)
stable for all DMs.
IV. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG STABILITY CONCEPTS
Using the structure of the metarational tree, two theorems are
given for describing interesting relationships among stability
definitions while a third theorem connects PSSs to certain
stability definitions.
Theorem 1: 1) Nash stability is equivalent to MR1 stabil-
ity; 2) General metarationality is equivalent to MR1 stability;
3) Symmetric metarationality is equivalent to MR2 stability.
Proof: 1) Recall that in the MR1 stability for DM i, only
DM i is allowed to move once. It is evident that MR1 stability
is equivalent to the Nash stability for DM i.
2) Suppose that s∗ is general metarational for DM i. If
R+i (s
∗) = ∅, then specify all policies of j = i staying at all
states. If i moves from s∗ to s1 ∈ Ri(s∗), then any i¯-sequence
of round 1 has s1 as its result, which is not more preferred to
s∗ by DM i. Therefore, s∗ is MR1 stable. If R+i (s∗) = ∅ and
let s1 ∈ R+i (s∗), then there is a state sx ∈ RN−i(s1) such that
sx i s∗. In other words, there is a sequence with moves by
N − i whose result sx is not more preferred to s∗ by DM i.
We take this sequence as the shortest one (containing the least
number of states). Then, each DM moves at most once at a state
in this sequence. Note that DM i is not involved in this sanction
sequence. This sequence can be used to specify a policy of
DM j by
Pj(s) =
{
s′, if [s, j, s′] is a part of the sequence
s, otherwise.
Then, the sanction sequence becomes an i¯-sequence of round 1.
In this way, s∗ is MR1 stable for DM i.
On the other hand, assume that s∗ is MR1 stable for DM
i, then it is evidently general metarational for DM i, since
a deviation of DM i will be followed by an i¯-sequence as a
sanction sequence.
3) Similar to the case of general metarationality. 
Theorem 2: 1) If a state s is MRr unstable for DM i,
then it is also MR1, MR2, . . . , and MRr−1 unstable for DM i.
Furthermore, if s is not an MRr resolution, then it is also not an
MR1, MR2, . . . , and MRr−1 resolution.
2) If a state s is MRr stable for DM i, then it is also
MR1, MR2, . . . , and MRr−1 stable for DM i. Furthermore, if
s is an MRr resolution, then it is also an MR1, MR2, . . . , and
MRr−1 resolution.
Proof: 1) If state s∗ is MRr unstable for DM i, then for
any given policies Pj of all other j = i, there is a deviation
from s∗ to s0 of DM i, such that the result of any i-sequence
of round r or shorter is more preferred to s∗ by DM i. Given
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l < r, if all those i-sequences are of round l or shorter, then s∗
is MRl unstable. Otherwise, let

s∗, i, s1,m1 , i
1,m
2 , s
1,m
2 , . . . ,
.
.
.
sl,m, i, sl,m1 , i
l,m
2 , s
l,m
2 , . . . ,
.
.
.
sk,m, i, sk,m1 , i
k,m
2 , s
k,m
2 , . . .


m=1,...,M
be all the i-sequences of round k with l < k ≤ r, whose results
are more preferred to s∗ by DM i. Then, one claims that
sl,m i s for at least one m. Otherwise, sl,m i s for all m =
1, . . . ,M . Then, if all DMs j = i change their policies to stay
at sl,m for all m, the results of all the above i-sequences will not
be more preferred to s∗ by DM i, which contradicts to the MRr
stability for DM i. Based on the conclusion, it is evident that
if s is not an MRr resolution, then it is not an MR1, MR2, . . . ,
and MRr−1 resolution.
2) Let s∗ be an MRl unstable for DM i for some l ∈
{1, . . . , r − 1}. Then, given any policies Pj of other players
j, there is an i¯-sequence of round l or a shorter terminated one,
whose result s¯ satisfies s¯ i s∗. If the sequence is terminated,
then s becomes MRh unstable for DM i. Otherwise, i is the next
mover since the sequence is an i¯-sequence. Then, i can simply
stay at s¯, which terminates the sequence with result s¯ better than
s∗ to i. Therefore, s∗ is MRh unstable for DM i. Based on this
conclusion, it is evident that if s is an MRr resolution, then it is
also an MR1, MR2, . . . , and MRr−1 resolution. 
Theorem 3: It holds that SMRr1 ⊆ SPSS ⊆ SMRr2 for all
r1, r2 = 1, 2, . . .
Proof: 1) This part shows SMRr1 ⊆ SPSS. Contrary to the
conclusion, let state s∗ be an MRr resolution, but not a PSS. By
definition of PSS, there is a DM i, such that for an arbitrarily
given policy Pj of all DM j = i, there exists a policy P′i of DM
i which moves away from s∗ and a sequence with respect to P′i
and {Pj}j∈N−i whose result is s¯ and
s¯ i s∗. (1)
Specifically, let Pj stay at all states s satisfying s i s∗ for all
DM j. Rename the sequence as


s1 = s∗, i, s11, i
1
2, s
1
2, . . . ,
s2, i, s21, i
2
2, s
2
2, . . . ,
.
.
.
sr, i, sr1, i
r
2, s
r
2, . . . ,
.
.
.


.
It contains an i-sequence of round r as a subsequence, whose
final state is sr1. If sr1 i s∗ for some r, then DM j stays at sr1
according to his or her policy Pj . Hence, the sequence becomes
terminated and the result is sr1 i s∗, which contradicts (1).
Therefore, sr1 i s∗ for all r and one concludes that state s∗
is MRr unstable for i.
2) This part shows SPSS ⊆ SMRr2 . Contrary to the conclu-
sion, suppose that a PSS s∗ with policies P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n is not an
MRr resolution, for example MRr unstable for DM i, for a
Fig. 3. Relationships among SMRr , SMRr and SPSS.
positive integer r. Then, with respect to P∗j , there is a policy
Pi and an i¯-sequence of round r, or a shorter terminated one
with a result more preferred to s∗ by DM i.
1) If this sequence is a terminated one, then the result of this
sequence is also the result of policies Pi and P∗j (for all
j ∈ N − i) with respect to status quo s∗ and first mover
i, which contradicts the fact that s∗ is a PSS with policies
P∗1 , . . . ,P∗n.
2) If this sequence is not a terminated one, revise Pi a little
to stay at all states more preferred to s∗. By adding i at the
end of the sequence, a shorter terminated sequence is ob-
tained. Then, the above arguments derive a contradiction
again. 
The relationships established in Theorems 2 and 3 are dis-
played in Fig. 3. In Example 1, {1, 2, 3} is a member of SPSS
and SMR1 but is not a member of SMR1 .
V. CREDIBLE POLICY AND
CREDIBLE METARATIONALITIES
A policy of a DM may contain some moves going to less
preferred states. A DM’s policy is deemed to be credible, if he
or she always moves to a more preferred state. Incredible moves
are excluded in the refinement of Nash equilibria in game
theory, such as the subgame perfect equilibrium of Selten [21].
Hence, a credible policy is defined as Pci (s) ∈ R+i (s) ∪ {s}.
The policy Pi in Example 1 is credible since each DM either
stays at the state s or only moves to a more preferred state.
By requiring a policy to be credible, one obtains a credi-
ble MRr (respectively MRr) denoted by CMRr (respectively
CMRr). The credible metarational tree shown in Fig. 4 is
constructed in a fashion that is similar to the metarational tree
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Fig. 4. DM i’s credible metarational tree given Pcj of all j ∈ N − i.
in Fig. 2. Notice that all the moves in Fig. 4 are restricted to
credible ones.
Deﬁnition 6: State s∗ is called i-credibly metarationally sta-
ble (respectively i¯-credibly metarationally stable) with r rounds
for DM i, denoted by s∗ ∈ SCMRri (respectively s∗ ∈ SCMRri ),
if for each s ∈ R+i (s∗), there is a set of credible policies Pcj of
all j = i, and an i-sequence (respectively i¯-sequence) starting
with [s∗, i, s] of r rounds or shorter such that the result of this
sequence is not more preferred to s∗ by DM i. A state s∗ is
called CMRr (respectively CMRr) resolution, denoted by s∗ ∈
SCMRr (respectively s∗ ∈ SCMRr ), iff it is CMRr (respectively
CMRr) stable for all DMs.
Similar to the conclusions of Theorem 1, the concept of
CMR1 stability is equivalent to the MR1 stability, or the Nash
stability. The concept of CMR1 stability (see round 1 of Fig. 4)
is equivalent to the following sequential stability of Fraser and
Hipel [6], [7].
Deﬁnition 7: For i ∈ N , a state s∗ ∈ S is sequentially stable
(SEQ) for DM i, denoted by s∗ ∈ SSEQi , iff for every s1 ∈
R+i (s
∗) there is at least one state sx ∈ R+N−i(s1) such that
sx i s∗. A state s∗ is called a sequential resolution, denoted
by s∗ ∈ SSEQ, iff it is sequentially stable for all DMs.
Similar to Theorem 2, the following theorem can be derived.
Theorem 4: 1) If a state s is CMRr unstable for DM i, then
it is also CMR1, CMR2, . . . , and CMRr−1 unstable for DM i.
Furthermore, if a state s is not a CMRr resolution, then it is also
not a CMR1, CMR2, . . . , and CMRr−1 resolution. 2) If a state s
is CMRr stable for DM i, then it is also CMR1, CMR2, . . . , and
CMRr−1 stable for DM i. Furthermore, if a state s is a CMRr
resolution, then it is also a CMR1, CMR2, . . . , and CMRr−1
resolution.
The following fact is evident.
Fact 1: If transitivity of movement holds for each DM i, then
for any H ⊆ N and state s′ ∈ R+H(s), it holds that R+H(s′) ⊆
R+H(s).
This fact is used in proving the following theorem.
Theorem 5: Given any positive integer r, if transitivity of
movement and preferences holds, then SCMRr = ∅ for a multi-
ple decision-maker conflict.
Proof: This proof is inspired by and generalizes the proof
of [7, Th. 13.23]. If the theorem is false for a given r, each state
is not CMRr for at least one DM (say i1). Specifically
let s0 be the state that is most preferred by DM i1 among
all those that are CMRr unstable states for DM i1. (2)
(Such a state s0 exists because of transitivity of preferences.)
Then, there is at least one i¯1-sequence of round r or a shorter
terminated one, beginning from a move by DM i1. Without loss
of generality, assume the sequence is not terminated. Otherwise,
the following argument holds for a smaller r. Let


s1,m = s0, i1, s
1,m
1 , i
1,m
2 , s
1,m
2 , . . . ,
s2,m, i1, s
2,m
1 , i
2,m
2 , s
2,m
2 , . . . ,
.
.
.
sr,m, i1, s
r,m
1 , i
r,m
2 , s
r,m
2 , . . . ,


m=1,...,M
be all such kinds of sequences, and hence sr,m i1 s0 holds for
all m = 1, 2, . . . ,M . One can claim that
sr,m1 i1 s0 for some m = 1, 2, . . . ,M. (3)
Otherwise, all DMs ir,m2 for m = 1, . . . ,M can use a policy
which stays at all sr,m1 (m = 1, 2, . . . ,M), so that there is no
i¯1-sequence of round r whose result is more preferred to s0 by
DM i1 and s0 becomes CMRr.
According to (2), sr,m1 is CMRr stable for DM i1 for some
m = 1, 2, . . . ,M by (3). If sr,m1 is also CMRr stable for all
j ∈ N − i, then the proof is completed. Otherwise, there is a
DM (say i2) and m such that sr,m1 is CMRr stable for i1 but not
CMRr stable for i2. It is now shown that if s ∈ R+N−i1(s
r,m
1 ) ∪
{sr,m1 }, then s is CMRr stable for DM i1. In fact, if s = sr,m1 ,
this has already been shown; otherwise, note first that s i s0
(if this inequality were false, then a sanction sequence against
i1 departing s0 is obtained), and the conclusion is true by (2).
Now, impose the induction assumption that, for 1 ≤ k < n,
there are distinct DMs i1, i2, . . . , ik+1 and a state pk such that
pk is not CMRr for DM ik+1 and if s ∈ R+N−i1−···−ik(pk) ∪
{pk}, then s is CMRr for i1, . . . , ik. Let qk+1 denote a state
of R+N−i1−···−ik(p
k) ∪ {pk} which is most preferred by ik+1
among all those that are not CMRr for ik+1. There is at least
one such state in R+N−i1−···−ik(p
k), namely pk. By the definition
of CMRr, DM ik+1 has a deviation from qk+1 to a better
state pk+1, which cannot be sanctioned by an i¯k+1 sequence
of round r. Observe by Fact 1 that pk+1 ∈ R+N−i1−···−ik(pk)
because qk+1 ∈ R+N−i1−···−ik(pk) and pk+1 ∈ R+ik+1(qk+1).
Since pk+1 ik+1 qk+1, then pk+1 is CMRr for ik+1 by the
definition of qk+1. Furthermore, it is CMRr for i1, . . . , ik by the
induction hypothesis. If either k = n− 1 or pk+1 is CMRr for
all N − i1 − · · · − ik − ik+1, the proof is finished. Otherwise,
there is a DM ik+2 ∈ N − i1 − · · · − ik+1 such that pi+1 is
not CMRr for ik+2. To complete the induction, it is necessary
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Fig. 5. States used in the proof of Theorem 5.
to show that if s ∈ R+N−i1−···−ik+1(pk+1) ∪ {pk+1}, then s is
CMRr for all i1, . . . , ik, ik+1 (see Fig. 5 for an illustration
of the notation). This assertion is true when s = pk+1, as has
already been shown. For other s, it holds that
s ∈R+N−i1−···−ik+1(pk+1) ⊆ R+N−i1−···−ik(pk+1)
⊆R+N−i1−···−ik(pk)
where the last relationship is from Fact 1. Therefore, s is
CMRr for i1, . . . , ik by the induction hypothesis. Furthermore,
since
s ∈ R+N−i1−···−ik−ik+1(pk+1) ⊆ R+N−ik+1(pk+1)
where the last relationship is from Fact 1, it holds that s ik+1
qk+1, otherwise, s is the result of a credible sanction i¯k+1-
sequence against ik+1’s deviation from qk+1 to pk+1. There-
fore, s is CMRr for ik+1 by the definition of qk+1. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Policy equilibria and associated PSSs are clearly defined
along with a new family of stability definitions for a conflict
having multiple DMs. The metarational tree provides a general
framework within which the family of stability concepts can be
conveniently defined and mathematical relationships rigorously
developed among stability definitions and PSSs. The first four
theorems provide an understanding of interesting relationships
among these new stability definitions while the last theorem
guarantees the existence of at least one equilibrium for specific
stability definitions. Because of the foregoing contributions, the
methodology of the graph model for conflict resolution can now
address a richer range of conflict situations. In practice, this
implies that enhanced insights and better decision advice can
be obtained using formal analyses for a particular conflict.
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